Written by Nasser Kandil,

The kidnappers of the soldiers did not find any way to bear down heavily upon the Lebanese government to accomplish their terms except the threat of killing those who are kidnapped, they gave this threat the feature of seriousness and pushed it to provoke and create stressful arenas for the public opinion, and the families of the kidnapped soldiers , to make the required price of their release is higher than the possible.

ISIL has succeeded in its war in Arsal since it went out safety. Through its localization in a Lebanon area (barren areas of Arsal ), ISIL adheres the center of Arsal, threatens internally and externally the sites of the army whenever it wants , holding the strength policy paper which is the kidnapped soldiers, Thus it  succeeded through its successive recorded slaughter actions to be first player in the Lebanon arena ,and made use of the issue of releasing those who were arrested in terrorism crimes as an inevitable probability to get back the soldiers, in order not to continue the slaughter actions ,and to oblige the families of the kidnapped to seize themselves to the idea of negotiation with the kidnappers and complete the exchange with them, although they are in a panic understood situation towards their children, after it seems that the whole official political and military administration of this issue is under the level of anticipations and ambitions.

Now the issue is not normal, unless the government puts a clear policy to deal with, the survival of this issue without any vision, it means the receipt of a third video for the slaughter of one of the hostages, and then maybe the situation turns to one of two directions, either a security breach towards kidnapping and killing alternatives, and maybe afterwards face to face fighting, and what it meant of the danger of falling into strife, or to accept the demands of the kidnappers.

The Turkish and Qatari attempt on which the government has betted, seems to be useless, because the armed people are relieved and are not under the pressure of finding an exit.  

What does the government have of the strength policy papers; it is a question in front of this deadlock. 

Just only the Lebanese country can inform the ones who want it to have an alliance of no intercourse with the Syrian country; I have given you enough time to solve your problem, so the government will give the green light to the command of the army to have a public formal call with the leadership of the Syrian army. In consequence of that, a delegation headed by the Lebanese defense minister will travel to Damascus after a call from the Lebanese Prime Minister with the Syrian one to coordinate a mutual military action, to complete the siege on the armed groups to oblige them to surrender and release the kidnapped soldiers. This attitude has a great political influence on the one hand, and its practically execution has a field effect of no less importance, unless the policy succeeds in moving the negotiation under the threat of a legitimate high-level relationship with the Syrian government and its army.

Under the grip of the country, there is something more important, it is the distinguishing between the legal elements which the negotiation upon considers an infringement of the judiciary and the ascendancy and those which the political authority has the right to dispose of. Here the destiny of the executions which imposed only by the force of law and under its influence arises, and the government can carry it out in negotiation, through its competences, unlike the release of the convicted terrorists or the arrested under investigation.

2014-09-08 | عدد القراءات 1593